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Kierkegaard and Approximation Knowledge
Thomas C. Anderson

There seems to be general agreement that one of Kierkegaard's
primary goals in writing the Postscript was to show the tremendous limitations and fallibility of a human being's cognitive
powers. In fact, many commentators claim that Kierkegaard is
epistemologically a skeptic, and they cite especially the Postscript
to support th~ir position (even though its author is the pseudonymous Johannes Climacus). For example, Mackey asserts that the
very intent of the Postscript is to show that every belief and every
truth claim about reality have no cognitive warrant. 1 Popkin also
believes that skepticism is the final result of Kierkegaard's epistemology; he writes, "When we search for true knowledge we end
up in complete skepticism."2 Many others similarly claim that Kierkegaard holds that it is in principle impossible, at least without
God's help, for humans to know if any particular explanation or
interpretation of reality is true. Price succinctly sums up this interpretation. He asks, "What then can I know?" and replies, "Nothing, says K.ierkegaard, nothing with any degree of real certainty;
nothing about God, nothing about the world as it really is."3

t'L. Mackey, Kierkegaard, a Kind of Poet (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971) 179-80; 189-92.
,
~- Popkin, "Kierkegaard and Skepticism," in Kierkegaard, A Collection of
Critical Essays, ed. J. Thompson (Garden City NY: Doubleday, 1972) 368.
3
G. Price, The Narrow Pass (London: Hutchinson, 1963) 113. Others who
advance this interpretation are K. Nordentoft, Kierkegaard's Psyclwlogy, trans. B:
Kirrnrnse (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1978) 334-39; J. Gill, "Kant,
Kierkegaard, and Religious Knowledge," in Essays on Kierkegaard (Minneapolis:
Burgess Pub. Co., 1969) 66-67; A. Hannay, Kierkegaard: The Arguments of the Philosophers (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982) 153.
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On the other hand, most of the above authors do recognize that
Kierkegaard admits the possibility of, and stresses the need for,
self-knowledge. Yet, not all realize the full ramification this admJ.ssion has on his alleged skepticism. Furthermore, while granting
that Kierkegaard believes that truths about one's self are obtainable, some limit such truths just to one's own individual reality4-a
position that I will critique later. Of course, almost every interpreter agrees that Kierkegaard believes that an individual person aided
by God's grace and revelation can attain a number of truths about
reality, whether or not such truths can be fully comprehended.
Various reasons have been offered in support of labeling Kierkegaard a skeptic. In this paper, however, I will address only one
of them, namely, Climacus's repeated assertions in the Postscript
that all empirical knowledge of reality is only "approximation."
Some interpret this to mean that such knowledge can, at best,
approach but never achieve truth about empirical reality. 5 It will
become clear in the course of this paper that I do not agree with
that interpretation.
In what follows, I will first set forth the views of Johannes
Climacus on this issue and, then, seek to determine the extent to
which Kierkegaard accepts Climacus's position. I will use the
following criteria to determine which Postscript positions are in fact
Kierkegaard's own.
1. Any position stated both by Climacus and by Kierkegaard in
works published under his own name will be considered to be
Kierkegaard 's.
2. Any position presented in those works published under the
pseudonym Anti-Climacus (Sickness Unto Death and Practice in
Christianity) will be considered Kierkegaard's. This is because
this later pseudonym was used not because Kierkegaard disagreed with, or dissociated himself from, the content of these

4

Price, The Narrow Pass, 113-21; Nordentoft, Kierkegaard's Psychology, 339-40;
Hannay, Kierkegaard, 152-53; A. Shmueli, Kierkegaard and Consciousness, trans. N.
Handelman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971) 43-45.
5
For a discussion of other reasons why Kierkegaard is considered to be a
skeptic, see my article "The Extent of Kierkegaard's Skepticism," Man and World
27 (1994): 271-89.
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works, but because he did not want to imply that he was living
Christianity at the level of perfection presented in them. 6
3. Finally, passages in his Journals where I<ierkegaard clearly
states his acceptance of a position of a pseudonymous author
will be considered his own, as, of course, will entries which
correspond to positions taken in the above mentioned works.
Section I
Empirical Knowledge as Approxim~tion
Climacus's Position
In the Postscript, Climacus offers a number of reasons for his
apparent skepticism about empirical knowledge, or, more precisely, for designating such knowledge as "approximation." Let us
investigate his comments carefully to see just what he means by
the use of that term.
1. In the first place all empirical beings, including human
knowers, are in the process of becoming. This means, Climacus
writes, that "truth itself is in the process of becoming and is [only]
by way of anticipation the agreement between thinking and being"
(CUP, 1:190, translation modified). The point apparently is that
truth, meaning the (fixed?) conformity or correspondence of
thought and being is unattainable because of the continual change
of both knower and known. Climacus refers to such truth as a
desideratum, a goal which would be achieved only if becoming
reached its end and ceased. The best we can obtain, he says, is
"approximation" to this goal.
2. A second reason Climacus offers for calling empirical
knowledge "approximation" is a typical anti-foundationalist one.
He points out that the "beginning [of empirical knowledge] cannot
be established absolutely" by thought itself but is in a sense
arbitrary. One reason it is arbitrary is because it is the knower who
decides the "limits" of his or her investigation of any empirical
data. Thus, for example, since all the members of a certain group
cannot be studied, generalizations about the entire group rest on

JP 6:6433, 6446, 6461. See also

6

the translators' introduction to SUD, xx-xxii.

190

International Kierkegaard Commentary

the selection of a limited sample. Such generalizations are,
therefore, inevitably approximations (CUP, 1:149-50). Furthermore,
any existing human being's knowledge takes place from one of
many limited perspectives or points of view. No individual can
· attain an unlimited, absolute, God's eye view of reality. Now
neither the selection of a particular perspective nor the selection of
the data to be investigated are themselves guaranteed by a
presuppositionless, indubitable, intellectually intuitive, self-evident
foundation. The selections rest ultimately on will, that is, on free
choice. I take it this is what Climacus means when he says "every
beginning [of empirical knowledge] ...does not occur by virtue of
immanental thinking but is made by virtue of a resolution,
essentially by virtue of faith" (CUP, 1:189).
3. A third reason why Climacus designates empirical knowledge as only approximation is because its object, empirical being,
is contingent. The Philosophical Fragments explains this in more
detail than does Postscript. Accepting Leibniz's distinction between
necessary truths of reason and contingent truths of fact, Climacus
places all empirical knowledge in the latter category, arguing that
such knowledge always lacks certitude or necessity, precisely
because the beings it seeks to know lack necessity?
In summary, since empirical reality is in constant change, since
all empirical knowledge is perspectival and begins in choice, since
empirical beings are thoroughly contingent, human knowledge of
empirical reality is only approximation. Climacus himself states
that conclusion, "objectively there is no truth for existing beings,
but only approximations ... " (CUP, 1:218, 224).
Yet in spite of such assertions, I am not convinced that
Climacus, the detached humorist, personally agrees with all the
positions he presents nor do I believe that the views that he sets
forth are as thoroughly skeptical as many make them out to be. I
say this for a number of reasons. In the first place, a thoroughgoing skepticism about the truth of all knowledge of empirical
reality would be incompatible with other positions Climacus
clearly holds. Moreover, such a skepticism has internal difficulties
that Climacus is well aware of. Finally, and this has been over-

7

See the Interlude in PF, 72-88, and pp. 23, 30, and 81.
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looked by man}" when Clirnacus labels empirical knowledge an
approximation, he very often does not mean that such knowledge
cannot achieve truth, but only that it cannot achieve intellectual
certitude or necessity. Let me elaborate.
For one thing, the claim that true knowledge of empirical
reality is unobtainable involves internal difficulties common to all
forms of skepticism, and Clirnacus is well aware of this. He
recognizes, for example, that there is a "basic certainty" (CUP
1:335ftn) contained within all skepticism. Specifically, to argue that,
because both the knower and the object of knowledge are changing, no true empirical knowledge is possible, presupposes that we
do in fact possess true knowledge of empirical beings, at least in
general, namely, that they are concrete, particular things that
change. Speaking of change, if one defines empirical truth, and
Climacus does, as the conformity or agreement of thought with
being, then, unless one considers reality to be a radical Heraclition
flux, and Climacus clearly does not, the mere fact that things
change, and are contingent, does not preclude true knowledge of
them in their relatively stable features. Climacus surely understands
this for he expresses his agreement with Aristotle on this point
(CUP, 1:312-13). He does, after all, give the empirical statement
"the earth is round" as an example of an objective truth (CUP,
1:194-95)-and one could think of countless other statements about
empirical reality which he would accept as true (e.g., Copenhagen
is in Denmark). In fact, as we shall see in the next section, he
claims to have a great deal of true knowledge about one kind of
changing, contingent being, the human self.
Furthermore, if Climacus actually believes that empirical
knowledge cannot attain truth, this would render unintelligible his
statements that such knowledge consists of approximations. If
empirical reality is unable to be truly known, it would be impossible to know whether any attempted explanation of it was close to
the truth or not, nor would one have any objective basis for
choosing among differing explanations. Yet Climacus never
suggests that he believes that every interpretation of reality is
equally arbitrary or has an equal claim to truth. Need I point out
that he obviously considers his own explanation of the general
character of empirical reality, and of the human self, to be, if not
absolutely true, more true than those offered by idealism, romanti-
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cism, rationalism, paganism, or Christendom. This has to mean
that he is not totally skeptical about the human ability to grasp
some truths about empirical beings.
In fact, much of the skepticism about empirical knowledge
· which is found in the Postscript rests upon a very rationalistic
and/or idealistic understanding of the nature of truth. 8 This becomes dear when one notes that the term approximation is often
used, not to mean approximation to truth, but approximation to
certitude about an eternal, finished, absolute system of knowledge.
In this light, let us look at each of the three reasons set forth above
which he gives for challenging the truth of empirical knowledge.
1. In spite of the fact that in the Postscript he defines empirical
truth as the conformity of thought and being, a definition which,
as I indicated, does not of itself preclude true knowledge of
changing beings, immediately after giving that definition Climacus
proceeds to limit such truth or conformity to the realm of the
totally eternal and unchanging. Speaking like an idealist who identifies truth only with the completed, and, therefore, unchanging,
system, he states that in the empirical realm truth is a goal which
can only be approximated or anticipated because "the empirical
object is not finished" and the knower is coming to be (CUP, 1:18990). In other words, empirical knowledge is called approximation
in comparison to an eternal finished (idealist) system. Note, however, this does not mean that such knowledge cannot be in
conformity with presently _existing empirical beings, and, therefore,
true in that sense.
2. Climacus's statements about the arbitrary character of the beginnings of empirical knowledge also have a rationalistic/idealistic
ring to them. On the one hand, some statements seem to assume,
with idealism, that truth lies only in the whole, in an absolute and
total grasp of reality. Otherwise, the mere fact that human knowledge is always from finite perspectives would not of itself mean
that it is an approximation. All that necessarily follows from the
perspectival character of human knowledge is that no individual
&rhus, I agree with Robert Perkins that it is Hegelian ideali.sm and not
empirical realism that Kierkegaard is against in CUP. See his "Kierkegaard's
Epistemological Preferences," International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4 (1973):
198-200, 214.
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can reach an absolute, unlimited, point of view from which to
grasp the truth about the whole of reality. The fact that human
knowledge is perspectival does not of itself mean that an individual cannot grasp any truth about reality, nor that his or her grasp
of reality is illusory or inaccurate, nor that he or she colors or
structures or creates the features of that which he or she knows.
Climacus himself draws none of these conclusions from the perspectival character of human knowledge. On the contrary he states
that "all knowledge and all apprehension has nothing to give from
itself" to the object known (PF, 80, translation modified). Moreover,
the fact that knowledge is perspectival does not of itself preclude
the possibility of one perspective allowing a more complete or
deeper grasp of the real than another, a position Climacus certainly
holds about his own views. To repeat, only if truth is identified
with a nonlimited (hence nonperspectival) absolute realm of
knowledge can human knowledge be considered to be just an
approximation because it involves a limited point of view.
I might add that the fact that empirical knowledge does not
begin with presuppositionless, indubitable, intuitively self-evident
principles also does not render it unable to truly grasp reality-unless one assumes with classical rationalism that only necessary
truths, those whose opposite is impossible, can furnish a proper
foundation for knowledge. True knowledge is simply that which
corresponds to reality, as Climacus himself recognizes; no more, no
less.
3. Finally, to call empirical knowledge an approximation because generalizations about empirical data are in principle falsifiable by new data does not mean that empirical knowledge cannot
be true but only that it cannot be absolutely certain or necessary.
Of course,the more data that supports an inductive generalization,
the more it approaches or approximates certitude. But not a ll empirical knowledge involves induction from incomplete data, and
even generalizations that do may in fact be true, that is, be in conformity with reality, even though they are in principle falsifiable.
To repeat, Climacus's use of the term approximation here means1
not approximation to truth (whatever that could mean), bu~
approximation to certitude. Similarly, for Climacus to designate all
empirical knowledge as approximate because its object is contingent or nonnecessary, is to say, as he does, that empirical knowl-

J
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edge is not certain in the sense of logically necessary. The opposite
of any statement about empirical reality is logically possible. This
is not, however, to say that empirical knowledge cannot be tr~e,
that is,. be in agreement with reality. Thus, when Climacus states
that all historical knowledge, and in fact all knowledge of contingent beings, is only "approximation knowledge," he is claiming
that the best it can do is approach, but never become, certain
knowledge, necessary knowledge, that whose opposite is impossible. He is not saying, however, that such knowledge can never be
in conformity with reality. 9
Thus, we see that the skepticism about empirical knowledge set
forth by Climacus, specifically his claim that all such knowledge
is only approximation, is not nearly as radical as some believe. It
rests on a highly rationalistic/idealistic conception of true knowledge, one which identifies true with necessary, logically certain,
absolute, eternal, complete. 10 Given such a conception, to say that
knowledge of empirical reality is approximate simply means it is
never necessary, logically certain, absolute, eternal, or complete.
Whether Kierkegaard actually intends to portray Climacus as one
who himself accepts this grand idealistic conception of truth, or
whether, as I suspect, he uses his pseudonym to show his rationalistic/idealistic contemporaries that their conception of truth
renders it unattainable for existing subjects, is not clear to me. In
- any case, the fact remains that if the author of the Postscript simply
sticks with the classical d~finition of truth as the correspondence
of thought with reality, a definition he himself offers, there is no
need for him to deny that humans can achieve true knowledge of
empirical beings. Indeed, Climacus does assert that knowledge,
even certain knowledge, is possible of at least one empirical being,
namely, one's self. That assertion buttresses my interpretation of

9-fn my optmon the Interlude of PF makes it dear that knowledge of
contingencies is uncertain, but not necessarily untrue. Likewise see CUP, 1:23-24,
30, 81, 152-53.
1
'Perkins, "Kierkegaard's Epistemological Preferences," makes a helpful
distinction between the Hegelian idealism which Kierkegaard (or Climacus)
opposes and a Socratic humanistic idealism which he accepts. For the source of
truth in the latter see nn. 21-24 below.
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his statements about empirical knowledge as approximation and
I will pursue this point in section II.
Let us turn now to Kierkegaard and attempt to determine what
he himself holds about the truth claims of empirical knowledge.
Kierkegaard's Position
In works published under his own name or that of Anti-Climacus, .Kierkegaard's main concerns are religious. Only infrequently
does he utter statements directly pertaining to .epistemology, and
even then the context is not philosophical but theological. Although they often discuss the relation between faith and knowledge, these works, unlike Climacus', set forth no general theory of
knowledge. Thus, it is not possible to determine whether every
single conclusion or argument presented by Climacus is accepted
by .Kierkegaard; all we can do is attempt to discover whether the
basic position or positions of the Postscript about empirical knowledge are .Kierkegaard's own.
I find little or no indication that .Kierkegaard himself is
skeptical about the human ability to attain true knowledge of
empirical reality. For one thingJ he certainly expresses his disagreement with the rationalistic/idealistic definitions of truth (as
necessary, logically certain, absoluteJ e ternal, complete) which was
the foil of Climacus's remarks about empirical knowledge as
approximation. Furthermore, in his religious writings, when he
does speak of human knowledge of empirical reality, such as
history or natural science, Kierkegaard does not say that such
knowledge cannot attain truth; in fact, he is sometimes willing to
grant that it can. 11 The question that concerns him is, rather, evenif history or natural science possesses true knowledge, is this truth
important·or relevant to an understanding of spirit and to the subjective task of becoming Christian? H e usually concludes that it is
not, and it may even be "dangerous" for it may "distract" one

11
At PC, 27, for example, Kierkegaard speaks of history "proving" particular
truths. Also, in CD he states that objective thought can be "true and profound"
(CD, 207).
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from his or her ethical task, the task of being spirit.12 In one
passage he puts it this way:
The main objection, the whole objection, to the natural sciences ·
can be expressed formally, simply, and unconditionally in this
way: It is incredible that a human being who has infinitely reflected about himself as spirit could then think of choosing the
natural sciences (with empirical material) as the task for his
striving.
(JP, 3:2820)

Indeed, natural science "becomes especially dangerous and corruptive when it wants to enter into the realm of the spirit" (JP 3:2809),
for it can only deal with the physical. It is also worth mentioning
that Climacus's favorite word, approximation, almost never occurs
in works Kierkegaard wrote under his own name or the pseudonym Anti-Climacus, and when it does it is almost exclusively used
in an ethicoreligious, not an epistemological, context. 13 There are
a few Journal entries, and they probably express Kierkegaard's own
view, which refer to the fallibility of human knowledge of
empirical reality since inductive generalizations are "merely
statistical" (JP 1:1072) and "an approximation process" (JP 3:2809);
However, as I argued above, the most one could infer from such
statements is that empirical knowledge is not certain or necessary;
they do not assert that such knowledge cannot be true.
It is the case that Kierkegaard, like Climacus, stresses the perspectival character of human knowledge. In an early Upbuilding
Discourse, for example, he writes, "what one sees depends on how
one sees ... how the observer himself is constituted is indeed
decisive" (EUD, 59). In later works, he repeatedly contrasts the
radically different interpretations the so-called na tural man and the
Christian have of things like guilt, suffering, love, natural inclinations, even of Christianity itself. He emphasizes that ultimately

12
PC, 31; EUD, 134-35. For Kierkegaard's comments on natural science see JP,
3:2809-24.
13
Except for JFY, 208-209, the word approximation does not even appear in the
various indexes compiled by Hong and Lowrie to works Kierkegaard published
under his own name or as Anti-Ciimacus. In Journal entries such as 2:2809, 2813,
and 4:4267, where he refers to natural science as approximation, the term seems
to mean that such science can attain no real knowledge about spirit or the ethical
and religious. Hence it is "qualitatively irrelevant" OP 3:2809).
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each individual must freely choose (with God's grace) to accept or
not accept the Christian perspective. In the same vein, Works of
Love states that "every event, every word, every act, in short,everything can be explained in many ways," and adds that variations in explanation are possible because of free choice (WL, 291).
For example, one can choose to love another and then his or her
explanation of the other's behavior will be significantly different
from that offered from the viewpoint of a nonlover. Such statements by Kierkegaard indkate that Climacus's v·i ew is his, namely,
human knowledge does not ultimately rest on indubitable, intellectually intuited, self-evident principles, but on freely chosen
starting points, based on light-hearted or serious intent. Accordingly, Kierkegaard's own position appears to be: "That by which a beginning [of "science and scholarship"] is made is a resolution" (JP,
2:2292).
Still, as I explained above, there is no contradiction in holding
that human knowledge is perspectival and rooted in freely chosen
starting points, and at the same time claiming that it can be in conformity with reality, that is, true. I will not repeat my arguments
but simply remark that Kierkegaard himself expresses little doubt
about the truth of his explanations of reality nor about their superiority, and the superiority of his perspective, over rival ones.
Thus, as far as empirical knowledge is concerned, I am extremely reluctant to attribute the alleged skepticism of the Postscript, that humans cannot attain truth about empirical reality, to
Kierkegaard himself. As I indicated above, I have serious doubts
that it should even be attributed to Climacus once one understands
that his statements about empirical knowledge as approximation
are directed against rationalistic/idealistic conceptions of truth. Of
course, one cannot prove the negative, but at least I can argue that
in the absence of any dear evidence in his own writings that he
believes that empirical knowledge is unable to attain truth, it
seems gratuitous to saddle Kierkegaard with such a skepticism, especially if one considers the implicit realism behind all his thought.
Let me conclude this section on this point, for it seems clear
that Kierkegaard and Climacus do both implicitly accept the basic
views of classical realism. Granted, realism as an epistemological
theory is never explicitly defended in detail by either of them, yet
is it not obvious in every one of his works that Kierkegaard and

I .
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all his pseudonymous authors acknowledge the existence of
particular beings independent of the knower, and believe that
these beings can be known to some degree? 14 One can also point
to Kierkegaard's and Climacus's r:epudiation of Hegelian Idealism
or pure thought precisely because it identifies reality with that
which is only in the realm of thought. Kierkegaard's and Climacus's complaint that such identification leaves out actual reality,
namely, concrete individual temporal beings, is further confirmation of their realism. Moreover, in the Postscript itself, while
admitting that Kant's skepticism about the ability of thought to
know reality cannot be overcome by thought itself, since that very
power is called into question, the author nevertheless categorically
rejects such skepticism. What one must do with it, he says, is just
"break" with it, and dismiss as a "temptation" any question about
the reality of a thing-in-itself eluding thought. Such questions, he
states, arise only when thought becomes too self-reflexive and
selfishly seeks to think itself (its own content), thereby refusing to
do its job of thinking other things. 15
Since I cannot imagine that anyone would seriously deny that
Kierkegaard and his pseudonymous author implicitly, at least,
adopt this basic position of epistemological realism, I will dwell on
this no further but tum instead to the most clear case where
Climacus and Kierkegaard do allow true and certain knowledge of
one kind of empirical reality, namely, knowledge of the human
self. As we shall see, the extent of such knowledge is much wider
than is realized by many who label Kierkegaard and Climacus
skeptics.

14
1n other wo.rds, I agree with Mackey that the basic assumptions of classical
realism are in the background of Kierkegaard's writings as "beliefs-which-it-is.not-necessary-to-call-into-question," 270, of "The Loss of the World in Kierkegaard's Ethics," in Kierkegaard, ed. Thompson. If I understand him corredly,
Robert Perkins also considers Kierkegaard to hold an empirical, realist metaphysics and epistemology, in "Always Himself: A Survey of Recent Kierkegaard
Literature," Southern Journal of Philosophy (Winter 1974): 543.ln Passionate Reason
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992) 138, C. S. Evans says Kierkegaard
is a realist like Plato and Aristotle.
1
SCUP, 1:328, 335.
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Section II
Knawledge of the Self
Climacus's Position
One of the major themes of part two, section ll of the Postscript
is that every individual should be a subjective thinker not a
detached objective one. That means, Climacus s~ys, that "in all his
thinking [the individual] has to include the thought that he himself
is an existing person" (CUP, 1:351). The subjective thinker should
continually strive to understand himself; indeed, such self-knowledge is the only certain knowledge an individual can attain. In his
exposition, Climacus, in fact, sets forth quite a large number of
items that each individual can and should come to know about the
self. 16 (1) A person can understand that the greatest ethical task he
or she has is to become a self or subject in the fullest sense; (2) A
person can come to see that this demands passionate interest in
one's self and repeated free decisions to (3) appropriate or live
what he or she knows from self-reflection he or she should be, and
this involves (4) knowing and unifyin g into a concrete harmony his
or her human faculties of imagination, feeling, passion, and
thought. 17 More generally, a person can understand that becoming
a self means (5) "to become a whole human being" (CUP, 1:346),
that is, to express in his or her individual existence " the essentially
human" (CUP 1:356). The latter statements presuppose, of course,
that one knows, or can know, what is essentially human. This point is extremely important for it shows that Climacus believes
that subjective reflection gives one not just an understanding of his
or her unique individual self but also knowledge of the general
nature or essence of the human self. This should not surprise us
since the statements about the human self which Climacus makes
throughout the Postscript are set forth not just as descriptions of
one individual self, Johannes Clirnacus, but as true and applicable
to every human self as such.
1
"See the whole discussion in CUP, 1, part II, sec. ll, chap. I, "Becoming
Subjective."
17
CUP, 1, part II, sec. II, chap. Ill, @4.
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However, some who consider him a skeptic about the powers
of human understanding claim that Climacus believes that true
knowledge of the self can be gained only through Divine Rev~la
tion.18 1t is true that Climacus states that from the Christian point
of view non-Christians are wrong in thinking that they have
within themselves the power to grasp the truth about themselves,
for the non-Christian does not realize how radically human beings
are gripped by sin and how sin renders them unable to understand
themselves. Since the remedy for sin can only be supplied by God,
only God can furnish the condition which enables us to grasp
truth.19 Now Climacus does say all this, yet he also presents
Socrates, the p ersonification of philosophy, as able to know many
things about the self.20 He also states that many such truths are
grasped in religion A, the religion of immanence, which is the
religion which "has only universal human nature as its presupposition" (CUP, 1:559) and "can be present in paganism" (CUP, 1:557).
True knowledge about the self is explicitly said to be attained by
the self's reflection on itself, a kind of Platonic "recollection" (PF,
87)/1 and it is sharply distinguished from the revealed truths of
Christianity (for example, original sin, forgiveness, Christ, the Godman, etc.) which "did not arise in any human heart" (PF, 109). It
seems evident, then, that Climacus believes that a great deal of
knowledge about the self can be attained by a human being.
Let me explicitly draw out the implications of all this on my
earlier interpretation of Climacus's alleged skepticism about
empirical knowledge, specifically his designation of it as approximation. As we saw above, a close reading of the texts showed that
Climacus so labels it for three reasons: {1} all empirical objects
change; (2) all such knowledge is perspectival and rests on choice
not on intuitively self-evident principles; and (3) empirical beings

SSee

1

the authors cited in nn. 3 and 4 above.
'1'F, 13, 51, 62-65.
211
CUP, 1:204-206; PF, 11-13, 20, 31, 87.
21
For Climacus's discussion of religion A and its source of knowledge see
CUP, 1:204-13, 555-61. See also the texts cited in the previous footnote. On this
point l agree with L. Pojman, The Logic of Subjectivity (University AL: University
of Alabama Press, 1984) chap. 3, and C. S. Evans, Kierkegaard's Fragments and
Postscript (Atlantic Highlands NJ: Humanities Press, 1983) chap. 8.
1
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are contingent. But to say this is to say that such knowledge is
never necessary, logically certain, absolute, eternal or complete;
that is, it is not true in a rationalistic/idealistic sense. It is not to
say that empirical knowledge cannot be true, meaning be in
conformity with reality. The fact that Climacus holds that humans
can have true knowledge of the self verifies this. After all, the self
changes continually and is contingent. Knowledge of it is not
based on necessary self-evident first principles and it is surely perspectival (e.g., a self can be grasped from an aesthetic or an ethical
or a religious perspective). Since Climacus asserts that knowledge
of the self can be certain, that must mean that designating empirical knowledge as approximation is not to be taken as skeptical
about the possibility of true knowledge of (at least one) empirical
reality. What, then, about Kierkegaard?
Kierkegaard' s Position
Anyone acquainted with Kierkegaard's religious writings
knows that throughout them he stresses the need for each individual to achieve an understanding of him or herself if he or she is to
become a true Christian. Like Climacus, he repeatedly contrasts
impersonal objective knowledge with knowledge that concentrates
on the self and insists on the need for the latter. In Judge For Yourself, for example, he distinguishes between a type of knowledge or
understanding that simply knows, and one that understands one's
self inwardly and in the direction of concrete action. 22 Also, like
Climacus, Kierkegaard believes that reflection on one's self yields
not just an understanding of one's unique individual self, but an
understanding of the essential nature of the self. This is evident if
one notes that in his religious writings Kierkegaard is not simply
engaged in·his personal autobiography when he stresses the need
for self-reflection and self-understanding. He continually makes
general statements about the nature of the self and its path (the
stages) to faith, statements obviously meant to apply to all selves.
Furthermore, again like Climacus, Kierkegaard holds that some
knowledge of the self is attainable by human understanding; it
need not come only through Divine Revelation. The Sickness unto

22

}FY, 35-45. Also see CD, 154-55, 207-208, and PC, 48-49, 205-206, 233-34.
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Death makes this clear for in it, as he sets forth the human
progression in self-knowledge, he indicates that some (partial)
knowledge of the self is possible this side of Christian revelation.
For example, he describes individuals who, though not believers,
are somewhat "conscious of being despair and therefore conscious
... of having a self in which there is something eternal" (SUD, 47).
Now to say that one is aware of having a self with something
eternal is to say that he or she is aware, to a some degree, of the
nature of that self. Furthermore, Kierkegaard describes and ranks
various types of despair in terms of their increased insight into the
nature of the self as spirit, and many of these forms of despair are
explicitly said to be present in non-Christians. 23 Thus, at the end of
his descriptions he states that these "gradation[s] in the consciousness of the self," are "within the category of the human self, or the
self whose criterion is man" (SUD, 79).
Accordingly, whether or not they agree on every detail, it is
clear that Kierkegaard holds Climacus's position that we can, in
spite of our radical sinfulness, arrive at a number of truths about
the nature of the self by our own powers. A number of Journal
entries make it plausible to assume that, like Climacus, he believes
that knowledge of the self's nature is available by recollection, that
is, by reflection on the mind's inner content. In one he states that
Plato's view that "all knowledge is recollection" is "beautiful,"
"profound," and "sound," and that" All philosophizing is a selfreflection of what already is given in consciou sness" (JP, 2:2274).24
- Of course, Kierkegaard believes that ultimately only the Christian
message brings the fullness of truth, as well as the power to accept
it. Yet this hardly means that what the non-Christian knows about
the self is completely false or unimportant. It seems necessary,
then, to draw the same conclusion that we did in Climacus's case.
Kierkegaard is not thoroughly skeptical about the possibility of
human knowledge of empirical beings, at least not when it comes
to knowledge of the human self. 25 We can be even stronger. Not
llSUD, 29-31, 47-74.
24
Also see, JP, 1:649; 3:3085 and 3606.
lSJ'he possibility of human knowledge of empirical beings other than the self
has special difficulties of its own which I have treated at length in "The extent of
Kierkegaard's skepticism."
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only is such knowledge possible, it is absolutely necessary for an
individual to attain some understanding of his or her self,
especially of his/her freedom and limitations, his/her obligation
to be a self, his/her need for the eternal, his/her weakness and
guilt, prior to any revelation. For only if one gains such knowledge
will they ever become receptive to God's revelation of their sins
and Christ's atonement and forgiveness.
However, to insist on the necessity of such knowledge of the
self raises problems of its own if one takes seriously the Postscript's
strong statements about the inverse relation between objective
truth (including, presumably, objective truths about the nature of
the self) and subjective truth (i.e., the subjective appropriation of
truths). But that is an issue for another paper.

